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We incorporate culture into a standard trade model in two distinct ways.  In the “cultural 
affinity from work” model, workers receive a non-pecuniary cultural benefit from work 
in a particular industry.  In the “cultural externality” model, consumers of a product 
receive utility from other consumer’s consumption of a domestic good.  We show that 
resistance to change due to cultural concerns can reduce the national benefits from trade 
liberalization.  Complete movements to free trade will have a positive national welfare 
impact in the cultural affinity case whereas it may lower national welfare in the cultural 
externality case.   We also show that a loss of cultural benefits is more likely to occur in 
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1. Introduction 
 
The reality of global cultural difference challenges the goal of creating an 
integrated world trading system based on common rules and norms.  For some advocates 
of trade liberalization, as represented by the expansive, post-Uruguay Round trade 
agenda, global cultural diversity represents an irritating distraction on the road to a 
rationally organized world economy.  For some opponents of globalization, the perceived 
threat to the global diversity of values and practices represents one of the great dangers of 
the policies animating the World Trade Organization (WTO).    Examples arise in the 
controversies over animal rights (the tuna/dolphin dispute), child labor (carpet 
manufacturing), and environmental protection (logging practices in tropical forests).  
Moreover, "culture" and similar terms are invoked with increasing frequency to justify 
departures from liberal trade: as in Japanese rules limiting practice by foreign attorneys 
(Coulter 1995); in French defense of farm subsidies as a means of preserving rural social 
life (Gardner 1996:101); or in Saudi opposition to foreign investment in the insurance 
sector (Pruzin 2002).   
The economic analysis of trade liberalization has largely ignored formal modeling 
of cultural factors, despite the fact that national cultural differences form an inescapable 
aspect of the global economic system.  Some exceptions have begun to appear.  Bala and 
Long (2004) develop an evolutionary model of preferences to show that a large country 
may be able to overrun the indigenous preferences of a smaller country through trade.  
However, their paper incorporates a value to culture only as an afterthought in saying that 
if governments place value in a particular preference structure they may opt for   4
protection to preserve a cultural heritage.  Janeba (2004) introduces culture explicitly into 
a Ricardian model by assuming an individual’s utility for a cultural good is based in part 
on how many others are also consuming it.  One implication is that trade can be welfare 
reducing when a country is culturally homogeneous.  Francois and van Ypersele (2002) 
also introduce a cultural effect by assuming consumption of some goods generate an 
externality.  They show the possibility that protection can raise welfare in the presence of 
cultural goods.  Finally, Lazear (1999) identifies culture with language and assumes that 
transactions costs are lower when trading with another person who shares one’s language 
(culture).  Rather than look at the effects of international trade, though, Lazear’s focus is 
on immigration patterns.   
This paper contributes to the literature by identifying and comparing the cultural 
and national welfare impacts of trade liberalization within two distinct trade models in 
which cultural values are incorporated.  In the first model (the cultural externality model) 
a domestically produced good provides a public as well as private benefit.  This model is 
most similar to Janeba (2004) and Francois and Ypersele (2002) in that culture arises out 
of a positive consumption externality.   The issue motivating this model are cases where 
protection is often suggested for domestic movies, music or other culturally based 
products.  In the second model (the cultural affinity model), workers in an import-
competing industry are assumed to derive “culturally-based” utility from employment in 
their own industry, but not from employment in the other industry.   This type of cultural 
effect does not appear elsewhere in the trade literature to our knowledge.  It is motivated 
by cases where resistance to trade liberalization arises because of cultural changes   5
induced by a reduction in the size of a domestic industry.  The cases of French and 
American family farming and traditional textile production in India provide several 
examples.        
This paper incorporates these two cultural effects in standard Hecksher-Ohlin 
trade models to demonstrate first, that culture can reduce the welfare effects from trade 
liberalization, and second that the way in which trade liberalization affects outcomes, 
whether welfare rises or falls, and the degree of cultural degradation, if any, is specific to 
the way in which culture manifests itself.  In the cultural externality model, trade 
liberalization can reduce national welfare and reduce cultural benefits since increasing 
imports of foreign cultural goods reduces the public cultural benefits obtained in 
consumption of the domestic good.  However, trade liberalization in the cultural affinity 
model, need not reduce welfare or cultural benefits since, as will be shown, worker 
behavior can safeguard the threatened industry.        
Next, we begin by briefly sketching the concept of culture as it informs the rest of 
our discussion.  We then consider two cases, both in the context of a standard two 
country - two good trade model, in which cultural values may affect the trajectory of 
trade liberalization.  We conclude by considering the application of these models to 
current policy challenges, and suggest where further research is needed.   
 
2.  Defining Culture 
Asserting cultural difference has become an increasingly common vehicle for 
challenging dominant policies and institutions (Anaya 1996, ch. 4; Stavenhagen 1995),   6
including a liberal international trading system.  Such claims reflect our assumptions 
regarding the nature of culture, notoriously one of the most complex concepts in the 
lexicon of social theory (Keesing 1974; Williams 1958; Winthrop 1991: 50-61).  In the 
most abstract sense culture describes a system of understandings through which social 
life is transacted (for an overview, see Hannerz 1992).  But culture exists in and through 
distinctive contexts--particular places, times, and social groupings--producing “bounded 
and localized system[s] of meanings” (Appadurai 1986:15).  In western Europe and 
North America, such local systems of meaning dictate that traffic proceeds on the right 
(not, except for Britain, on the left); that nature is considered a resource (not, as in 
American Indian societies, an abode of spirits); that employment opportunities should be 
gender-blind (not, as in Saudi Arabia, gender-determined); and that consumption should 
be maximized  (in contrast to the Amish).   
This usage, broadly representative of anthropological theory, contrasts with 
another: culture as a society's intellectual and artistic achievements, a usage alive and 
well in economics.  In the latter sense, culture involves "activities drawing upon the 
enlightenment and education of the mind rather than the acquisition of purely technical or 
vocational skills" (Throsby 2001:4).  Relative to the broader, anthropological usage, this 
is both highly restrictive and highly commodified (see Dominguez 2000).  From this 
follows the notion of cultural industries (and the related cultural goods and cultural 
services), including cinema, ballet, book and magazine publishing, and the like (Acheson 
and Maule 1999: ch. 1; Bernier 1998; Keat 2000; Throsby 2001: ch. 7).  As the phrase 
"cultural industries" is commonly applied in trade policy debates, we do not contest its   7
usage, but emphasize that this represents a departure from the concept of culture 
employed here.   
From an economic perspective, cultural systems act to constrain both the choice 
sets and the reasoning of individual actors in a given decision context.  Operating within 
a cultural system thus can be construed as a type of bounded rationality.  Choice under 
cultural constraint remains nonetheless a rational procedure: "the (much needed) realism 
injected by bounded rationality does not alter the essentially rational nature of Homo 
Economicus; it merely redefines the boundaries of rationality" (Doucouliagos 1994:879).  
Thus a religiously observant Muslim banker acts rationally in avoiding transactions 
involving payments of interest, given the prohibition on interest in Islamic law.  He 
maximizes utility within what is (culturally) possible, usually by having the lender share 
in the risk of a borrower’s investment, so that the rate of return is not fixed in advance 
(Haron 1995:29).  Similarly, because it is prohibited in the Torah, an Orthodox Jew will 
not shift her diet choices from beef to pork, regardless of how low the price of pork may 
fall.  Her marginal rate of substitution of pork for beef remains zero.   
 
3.  The Cultural Externality Model  
The first model considers non-pecuniary cultural benefits resulting from 
consumption of certain goods and services: the cultural externality model.  We develop 
this variation using the example of national protection for domestic media. 
a)  Cultural Externalities 
Film, television, newspapers, and magazines provide a picture of the society in 
which they are produced.  In this way media can be powerful determinants of national   8
identity.  The protection of domestic information and entertainment media from the 
dominant market power of foreign competitors constitutes the most widely recognized 
example of cultural constraints on trade.  (For an overview, see Bernier 1998.)  
Exempting information and entertainment media from the normal WTO principle of 
national treatment (treating goods or services in a uniform manner regardless of the 
country of origin) defines for many scholars the “cultural exception” in trade policy 
(Bhala 2001: 463-98).  For advocates of these protections (including the Canadian and 
French governments), visual media such as film and television, and print media such as 
books, newspapers, and magazines should not be understood as conventional goods or 
services, but as “cultural products” created by “cultural industries.”  The protection of a 
nation’s cultural products, argues French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine, is justified “by 
their impact on the language, the mentality, and the deep identity of the country,” as well 
as by the quasi-monopolistic position of American media (Vedrine et al. 2001: 19).   
Canadian efforts to protect domestic media have been among the most widely 
discussed examples of culturally protectionist trade policies.  The United States is not 
only Canada’s largest trading partner, but increasingly the source of its news, its 
entertainment, its political commentary, and--many Canadians fear--its values.  Some 
statistics: 95 percent of feature films screened in Canada are foreign; and 83 percent of 
newsstand magazine sales are for foreign periodicals (Rabinovitch 1998: 30).
3 
                                                 
3  In the 1990s Canada responded to foreign (read: American) domination of its magazine market 
with several measures, including a special tariff, an eighty percent excise tax on foreign 
periodicals, and preferential postage rates for domestic periodicals.  The United States 
successfully challenged these policies at the World Trade Organization, whose dispute settlement 
board found all measures in violation of WTO rules (Carmody 1999, Sec. IV). See Carmody 1999 
and Knight 1999 for an analysis of this case.   9
Whether the predominance of foreign media should be a matter for concern 
depends on one’s understanding of the appropriate role of media and the value of market 
competition.  Opponents of protections for domestic media hold that success or failure of 
media enterprises should reflect consumer preferences, in a manner comparable to other 
goods and services.  If Canadian consumers did not prefer foreign films, television 
programs, newspapers, or magazines to their domestic counterparts, they would not 
dominate local markets (Acheson and Maule 1999: 18-22).    
Proponents of protections approach the problem with fundamentally different 
assumptions.  The most basic justification concerns the displacement of domestic content: 
“foreign product crowds out ‘national voices telling national stories’” (Acheson and 
Maule 1999: 11).  A second argument focuses not on content , but on the potential role of 
media in creating a national cultural discourse.  “Cultural products and services 
communicate ideas and information [which bring] . . . . Canadians together as audiences 
and as communities of active, reflective citizens” (Rabinovitch 1998: 29).  In this view, 
“culture is a historically developed context in which those whose identity is at stake 
participate” (Baker 2000: 1368).  As Baker points out, this argument presumes that 
national “cultural industries” constitute a public good.  Like national defense or clean air, 
the capacity for an evolving national identity cannot be adequately provided by 
conventional market forces (Baker 2000: 1378-89). 
b) A Cultural Externality Model    
To model such a cultural public good, we assume that all individuals in Country 
A receive benefits from the presence of a locally produced “cultural” good.  Consumption   10
of the cultural good by other residents of A is assumed to raise each individual’s utility.  
In this way consumption by each person has a positive external effect on all others, i.e., 
there is a consumption externality, and thus the good has public good characteristics.  An 
aggregate utility function incorporating the consumption externality can be written as, 
A B A A B A S δ ) C , u(C ) S   , C , U(C + =  (13) 
where CA is the aggregate consumption of the cultural good,  CB is the consumption of 
good B, and SA is the total amount of the domestic cultural good produced.  The final part 
of the expression incorporates the additional utility consumers receive from aggregate 
consumption of the domestic cultural good, where δ represents the marginal utility from 
additional production of the cultural good.   
  The aggregate equilibrium is found by maximizing national welfare in (13) 
subject to the following four constraints.   
 S B  =  T(SA)        ( 1 4 )  
 E B  =  ψ(MA)        ( 1 5 )  
 C A  =  SA  +  MA      ( 1 6 )  
 C B  =  SB  -  EB     (17)   
Equation 14 specifies the transformation curve.  Equation 15 is the foreign offer 
curve giving the relationship between domestic imports of A, MA, and exports of B, EB.  
Equation 16 says that domestic consumption of A must equal production plus imports 
and equation 17 states that consumption of B equals production minus exports.  The 
Lagrangian for this system can be written,   11
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Maximizing L with respect to choice variables CA, CB, SA, SB, MA, EB and the 
four Lagrange multipliers, and assuming an interior solution, yields the following first-
order conditions, 
uCA  +  λ3    =    0       (19a)   
uCB  +  λ4    =    0       (19b) 
δ  - λ1 T’(SA)   -  λ3  =  0        (19c) 
λ1  -  λ4    =    0       (19d) 
λ2  +  λ4    =    0       (19e) 
- λ3  -  λ2 ψ’(MA)  =    0      (19f) 
plus four constraints.   
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where DRS is the domestic marginal rate of substitution in consumption between goods 
A and B.   













=    (20b) 
where DRT, the slope of the transformation curve, is the domestic marginal rate of 
transformation between goods A and B.  
And finally, combining (19e) and (19f) yields,   12





3 = =      ( 2 0 c )  
where FRT is the foreign rate of transformation, the slope of the foreign offer curve, 
between goods A and B.   
  Combining (20a), (20b) and (20c) shows that when the cultural externality exists 
and δ > 0,  
  DRT  <   DRS   =   FRT        (21)  
at the equilibrium when there is no intervention, taxes or tariffs, in the market.  
  A free trade equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1.  Production is at P1 with the 
domestic rate of transformation, DRT1, given by the slope of the transformation curve at 
P1.  Since we assume this is a small country, the foreign rate of transformation is simply 
the world price ratio.   From (21) FRT exceeds DRT, given by the steeper line drawn 
through P1.  Finally, the domestic rate of substitution, DRS1, is equal to FRT and 
determines the consumption point C1 at the tangency of the indifference curve with utility 
level U1. Notice that consumption occurs inside the production frontier.  This occurs 
because the consumption externality, which is not corrected in the free trade equilibrium, 
leads to domestic underproduction of the cultural good A, relative to what’s best from a 
social standpoint.  Also, the larger is the cultural externality effect, represented by δ, the 
larger will be the deviation between DRT and FRT, the lower will be the production of 
good A in a free trade equilibrium, and the lower will be national welfare.   
  Next consider what occurs if a tariff is implemented on the imported cultural good 
A.  A tariff will have two effects.  First, it will raise the domestic price received by 
producers leading to an increase in DRT.  Second, the tariff will raise the domestic price 
of good A to consumers resulting in an increase in DRS.  If the optimal tariff is   13
implemented, it will correct the distortion such that DRT2 = FRT leading to a shift in 
production to P2 as shown in Figure 2.  However, the tariff creates a second distortion by 
raising DRS. The higher consumer price of good A leads to a substitution away from A 
towards B along any indifference curve.  The new consumption point with the tariff in 


















However, as is well-known from the theory of the second-best, the optimal policy 
to correct for this type of externality will not be a trade policy, such as a tariff.  Instead, a 
more efficient correction of the externality can be achieved with a purely domestic 
policy, since this type of policy will correct the externality effect more directly.   In this 
case the proper policy choice is a production subsidy to domestic firms producing good 
A.  The production subsidy has the advantage of affecting only the price faced by 
producers, thus affecting DRT, without affecting the price paid by consumers, equal to   14
DRS. As such, if a production subsidy is set at a level sufficient to bring DRT to equality 
with FRT, then production will rise to P2 in the diagram, as was true with the tariff.  
However, consumption will not be distorted allowing consumption to move to C3 on the 
higher indifference curve with utility U3.    It is clear from the diagram that the optimal 
tariff policy will never be superior to the optimal domestic production subsidy. Hence the 
tariff is a second-best policy choice while the production subsidy is first-best.     
These results suggest several things.  First, in the presence of the cultural 
consumption externality, the optimal tariff is positive for the small importing country.  
The size of the optimal tariff depends upon the strength of the externality effect. The 
greater the marginal impact of total consumption on each individual, the larger will be the 
optimal tariff.  This result implies that protectionism in the form of a tariff is a national 
welfare improving policy when it protects against imports that compete with a culturally 
important domestic product.   It also means that trade liberalization that encourages 
greater imports of a foreign good, and which competes with a domestic good that has 
cultural value, may result in a reduction in well being for the country rather than an 
improvement.  This argument can be used to argue for a cultural exception in trade 
policy, that is, that countries should be allowed to protect against imports of goods, or 
should be allowed some exceptions in trade liberalization for goods that compete with 
culturally important domestic products.   
Of course, it is true that tariffs are often easier to implement since they generate 
government revenue rather than obligating government expenditures.   In addition, 
despite the opportunity for cultural conservation through the use of trade or domestic 
policy, optimal implementation assumes good knowledge about the nature and magnitude   15
of the cultural effect.  In the case of cultural externalities, δ would be difficult to measure 
accurately.  If δ were relatively small for a country and if that country put a very high 
protective tariff or production subsidy into place, then the efficiency losses would likely 
exceed the cultural benefits and result in a reduction in national and individual welfare.  
In other words, with inaccurate measurement, a government would not be able to assure 
that the protection provided would result in a national improvement.  Just because an 
optimal tariff or subsidy exists, does not imply that the appropriate level is easy to 
identify.  It is not true that any tariff or subsidy will be better in the presence of a cultural 
externality, only that tariffs or subsidies at the proper level can lead to an improvement.    
 
4. The Cultural Affinity of Work Model 
a)  Non-Pecuniary Cultural Benefits  
In this model variation, we postulate the existence of a non-pecuniary cultural 
benefit (a form of psychic income) for workers in the import-competing sector of the 
labor market, and examine its effect on worker mobility when a decrease in trade 
protection causes falling wages.   
Labor economics has long recognized that a decision to accept employment or to 
remain employed is sometimes determined by more than the respective wages offered by 
alternative firms and industries in a worker's job choice set.
   Because employment 
information and worker mobility are neither perfect nor costless, short-run labor markets 
may diverge from long-run equilibrium conditions.  Beyond these factors lies a range of   16
intangible influences on job choice, conventionally termed psychic or non-pecuniary 
benefits .
4  
Monastic labor, as seen in Catholicism's Benedictine Order, offers an extreme 
example of the importance of non-pecuniary benefits.  The very considerable labor that is 
entailed in monastic life is not directly compensated: material simplicity is the norm.  
From the perspective of monastic culture, work itself has positive utility, one element in a 
mode of life intended to bring an individual closer to God.  In the words of an early 
monastic text, "I go to the place where labour is, and labour becometh unto me a 
pleasure" (Budge 1934: Bk. 1, 235).  
It is not the activity per se that generates the psychic benefit found in monastic 
labor--otherwise, all farming, book binding, and teaching (typical monastic occupations) 
would be compensated at the minimal levels of food and shelter found in monastic 
households.  Rather, the non-pecuniary benefits accrue from the work performed in the 
cultural context of monastic life: the utility of labor is at least in part culturally mediated.  
This is not a new idea.  As Lester Thurow noted, "In a society where many people place a 
high premium on 'machismo,' a job with high physical risks may be considered a better 
job than a job with low physical risks" (Thurow 1978:142).   
The types of cultural values suggested by Thurow can be expected to influence 
job choice in all relevant occupations across the labor market.  But because such effects 
are not sector-specific, they may not affect the patterns of economic adjustment that 
would be encountered by import-competing industries facing trade liberalization.  Our 
aim is to model a type of cultural effect on job choice (and thus labor mobility) that 
                                                 
4   For a thorough discussion of non-pecuniary influences on wage determination see Rosen 
(1986).     17
reflects the intrinsic attributes of a particular economic sector, which we term non-
pecuniary cultural benefits (NPCBs). 
We suggest that NPCBs can originate in at least two ways.  First, following the 
analyses of Keat and MacIntyre, work may provide psychic benefit directly by the 
opportunity to achieve excellence in a culturally salient activity: scientific discovery in 
biomedical research; athletic achievement in baseball; artistic accomplishment in jazz 
piano (Keat 2000: ch. 6;  MacIntyre 1984: ch. 14).  Second, work may generate psychic 
benefit indirectly, by involvement in a valued, culturally distinctive social system 
integrating work and community.  Under the rubric of "the multifunctional character of 
agriculture," the European Union now asserts the importance of a range of public goods 
agriculture provides: distinctive rural landscapes, biodiversity, and the viability of rural 
social life (European Commission 1998).  Similarly, American timber workers discuss 
the value of their work not so much in terms of the intrinsic satisfaction of their 
dangerous and physically demanding jobs, but the benefits they experience from living in 
rural, forestry-based communities (Brown 1995).  The two sets of benefits are not 
mutually exclusive.  We contend that both types of sector-specific cultural benefits affect 
the demand for employment in such sectors, and thereby the impacts of changing wages n 
import competing sectors produced through trade liberalization.   
b) A Cultural Affinity Model 
We will use a standard two-sector international trade model and assume two 
goods (A and B) are produced with two factors of production (labor and capital) under 
constant returns to scale. Goods and factor markets are assumed to be perfectly 
competitive.  In the short-run, labor is assumed to be perfectly mobile between industries   18
but capital is immobile.  This is the standard capital-specificity model of Jones (1971), 
Mussa (1974) and Neary (1978).  In the long-run, following Neary (1978), we’ll assume 
capital is mobile between industries reflecting an eventual convergence to the Heckscher-
Ohlin model.  Full employment of capital and labor is maintained throughout.  
We’ll begin with a baseline equilibrium in which we’ll assume an import industry 
A, with an import tariff in place, and an export sector B.  Suppose all capital and labor is 
allocated to their long-run positions such that wages and rents are equalized between 
industries.
5      
Demand for goods A and B is represented by a community-wide utility function 
U(CA, CB) where U is the utility, and CA and CB are total demands for goods A and B 
respectively.    In the aggregate, utility maximization implies that the marginal rate of 
substitution in consumption must equal the domestic price ratio.  However, in the 
presence of a NPCB, utility will be derived both from the consumption of goods and from 
the context in which production takes place, namely in which industry a worker derives 
his or her income.  Without loss in generality, we will assume that the cultural benefit 
arises only for workers in the import-competing industry.
6  With the NPCB included, the 
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5 The initial equality of wages across sectors is not necessary for these same results to follow, however the 
assumption does make for a convenient point of reference. 
6   Since the exercise we perform is trade liberalization, this will cause a movement of factors 
from the import sector to the export sector.  Since workers in the export industry will have no 
reason to exit the industry, it will be immaterial if they have an NPCB.     19
where ULA is the utility of a representative worker in industry A, and NA is the non-
pecuniary cultural benefit that accrues to this worker when he or she works in industry A.   
This benefit disappears if the worker switches employment to the B industry.   
The effect of the cultural benefit is to raise utility of workers above the level 
attained by workers in industry B.  Even though workers in each industry make the same 
initial wage, the benefit NA accrues to A workers but not to B workers.  Furthermore, 
workers in B have no incentive to switch to A, since, having no history working in A, 
they would not perceive a cultural benefit.
7  This implies that the development of cultural 
sentiments in A, i.e., an increase in the value of NA over time, will not upset the initial 
long-run equilibrium.   The cultural benefit that accrues to workers in A represents a non-
pecuniary rent.  
c) Effects of Trade Liberalization 
In Figure 1, the initial long-run equilibrium is represented on the top diagram by 
the intersection of the value of marginal product of labor curves VA
0 and VB
0.  The 
equilibrium wage is determined at wA
0 = wB
0.  The intersection defines the allocation of 
labor between the two industries measured along the horizontal axis with CD allocated to 
industry B and DOA to industry A.   
We’ll consider three different stages of adjustment to trade liberalization.  In the 
first stage we’ll assume the price decline is insufficient to cause labor adjustment 
between industries. In the second stage we’ll assume the price decline does cause labor 
                                                 
7   The idea is that cultural benefits arise as a history develops in an industry.  A new entrant to an 
industry would not receive the cultural benefit until he or she had been there for some time.  As 
long as the marginal cultural benefit to a new worker is zero at time of entry, B workers would 
not be attracted to industry A.  Alternatively, we could assume that B workers have established 
their own history and cultural benefits which would have to be given up to move to industry A 
where new cultural benefits would take time to accrue.     20
adjustment.  In the third stage we’ll assume adjustment proceeds to a long-run 
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Stage 1: No Labor or Capital Adjustment  
When trade liberalization occurs, the price of the imported good (A) falls on the 
domestic market.  This leads to a downward shift in the value of marginal product curve 
in industry A to VA
1. The initial effect, before any factors can adjust, is a reduction in the 
wage and rental rate to factors employed in the import industry A.   In the diagram, the 
wage rate in A will fall to wA
1, proportional to the price decrease, where VA
1 crosses the 
initial labor allocation position.  The rental rate will also fall proportionately to the price 
reduction as owners compete among themselves for market share.  Remember that   21
although labor and capital is immobile across industries it is not immobile between firms 
within the industry.   
  If the price decrease is small enough, or if the NPCB (NA) is large, the 
wage reduction in industry A will not be sufficient to induce workers to accept the 
relatively higher wage in B, since to do so would mean foregoing the larger NPCB. The 
utility cost of switching to industry B is NA while the utility benefit is μ(wB – wA) where 
μ is the marginal utility of income.
8  Thus, if wB – wA <  NA/ μ  workers will remain in 
industry A despite the price decrease and the short-run equilibrium will be maintained 
until capital begins to adjust in the long-run.   
Thus, the short-run effect of moderate trade liberalization is to lower wages and 
rents in the import industry with NPCB.  Workers in the industry suffer real losses in 
money terms but do not suffer a loss of cultural value since they choose to remain in the 
industry.  Instead the non-pecuniary rents that accumulated over the past due to rising 
affinity for work in the industry, are substituted by lower wages when the industry 
declines.  Note if the NPCB is extremely high or the price decline sufficiently small, this 
equilibrium may be the final result even after complete trade liberalization is 
accomplished.     
 
Stage 2: Labor Adjustment but no Capital Adjustment 
Next suppose a price decrease (tariff reduction) drives the wage differential 
sufficiently far apart to induce labor mobility between industries A and B, i.e., wB – wA >  
NA/ μ.   Assume we remain in the short-run with respect to capital mobility.  Also, 
assume for convenience, that the wage differential, wB 
0 – wA
1 above, was just equal to   22
NA/ μ.  Thus, any further price decrease will cause a shift to a new short-run equilibrium.  
Suppose the price decline shifts A’s value of marginal product curve to VA
2.  The 
presence of the NPCB means that a wage differential will be maintained between the two 
industries, such that wB  – wA = NA/ μ.   
In the adjustment, the lower import price drives wages in A lower than needed to 
compensate for the NPCB.  This will induce some workers to shift from A to B in pursuit 
of the higher wage.  The new short-run equilibrium will involve a shift of labor of 
quantity DE from industry A to B.  The wage rate in industry B will be pushed down to 
wB 
2, while the wage in A will move to wA
2.  Due to the partial labor reallocation, the 
secondary reduction in the wage in industry A will be less than proportional to the price 
decrease.  In other words, once wages are driven sufficiently apart, the rate of decline of 
industry A’s wage is reduced.   In the Edgeworth box diagram below, the labor 
reallocation causes a shift in the equilibrium from F to G and moves production off the 
Pareto-optimal contract curve.   
In the new short-run equilibrium, workers with a NPCB in industry A are 
indifferent between working in A or B.  If a worker shifts to B he gives up the NPCB but 
is compensated for the loss with the higher wage.  The worker who remains in A 
continues to enjoy the NPCB but endures a lower wage to achieve that benefit.   Because 
industry A declines in size with the shift of workers, total societal cultural benefits are 




                                                                                                                                                 
8  The formula requires the marginal utility of income to be fixed for all income levels.     23
Stage 3: Labor Adjustment and Capital Adjustment 
Eventually, because rental rates in the two industries have been driven apart with 
higher rents obtaining in industry B, there will be a reallocation of capital in the long-run 
from industry A to B.  Since industry B is capital-intensive, it will demand more capital 
per worker than industry A is able to give up resulting in excess demand for capital and 
excess supply of labor during the adjustment.  The increase in capital in industry B will 
raise its value of marginal product curve upwards as to VB
3 in the diagram.  Loss of 
capital in industry A will reduce its VMPL curve to VA
3.  The final resource allocation 
shifts to point H in the lower diagram.  
At the long-run equilibrium, rental rates are equalized between industries A and 
B. The wage distortion persists however at the level   wB 
3 – wA
3 = NA/ μ.  This implies 
that the wage-rental ratios are not equal in the two industries and thus resource allocation 
lies on a distorted contract curve given by OBHOA.   The drop in price of the labor–
intensive good also leads to the long-run reduction in the wage rental rate in both A and 
B, thus the capital-labor ratio falls in both industries.  Wages will ultimately fall in both 
sectors, but they will fall more in the culturally important sector than in the export sector.  
Rental rates will rise since the country is assumed to be capital-abundant.   
 
National Welfare Effects 
We can use this model to compare the overall national gains from trade that 
accrue with and without a cultural affinity effect.  In the absence of a NPCB, it is well 
known that free trade results in an improvement in national welfare, despite the fact that 
the country’s relatively scarce factor (here, labor) will suffer real losses.    When workers   24
receive a non-pecuniary cultural benefit as a result of work in industry A however, the 
adjustment of capital and labor is not as complete as would occur without the cultural 
benefit.  This is because in free trade a wage differential is maintained between workers 
in the two industries, representing a market distortion.  However, since the distortion acts 
to maintain the cultural benefits of industry A workers, national welfare does rise with 
free trade in this version of the model compared with protection.   A further implication is 
that empirical estimates of the benefits that countries will attain (such as GDP increases) 
from trade liberalization may be overestimates of the true welfare effects because these 
studies do not explicitly incorporate distortionary cultural effects into their models.   
 
Cultural Effects of Trade Liberalization with NPCB 
A common criticism of trade liberalization is its contribution to global cultural 
homogenization.  Dani Rodrik argues that international trade encourages an  
"arbitrage in national norms and social institutions. . . . by raising the social cost of 
maintaining divergent social arrangements" (Rodrik 1997, 29). (also see Cohen 2002).  
While this may sometimes be true, our analysis of liberalization in the presence of non-
pecuniary cultural benefits suggests a different outcome.   
In the cultural affinity model, moderate trade liberalization need not lead to declining 
employment in the industry with NPCB.  Insofar as work directly or indirectly 
contributes to cultural transmission (as is assumed in this model), although wages will 
decline, non-pecuniary cultural benefits remain.  In effect, falling wages eliminates the 
non-pecuniary rents that were obtained with protection but need not have an effect upon 
the work culture or the number of workers who enjoy these benefits.     25
In addition, the larger the cultural affinity of workers, the stronger is the resistance to 
adjustment.  When the cultural affinity is very large, even a movement to free trade may 
not sufficiently reduce wages to induce a shift of workers between industries. Thus, the 
stronger the cultural affinity in an industry, the less likely that trade liberalization will 
result in a loss of the cultural understandings with which it is associated.   
 
Cultural Evolution  
Consider briefly the model in a dynamic context, in which, over time, older 
workers retire from the workforce while young workers enter. To model a dynamic 
system, we hypothesize that younger workers have a smaller affinity for work in the 
import sector than do older workers.  This may reflect a lack of appreciation for the 
community life associated with that particular production sector, or exposure to a more 
modern system of values during their childhood.   
Once trade liberalization has begun, because of the cultural aversion to job 
switching by the veteran workers, a wage differential between industries develops.  
However, when workers retire, it will lower the supply of workers to the domestic import 
competing industry, which in turn will begin to raise the wage of remaining workers.  
New workers entering the workforce will not be attracted to the import sector because of 
the lower wage and because they have no cultural attachments to the sector.  Thus they 
will seek work only in the high wage export sector.  The increased supply of labor to this 
sector, over time, will bid down their wage rate.  Eventually, wages in the import sector 
will rise up to meet the declining wages in the export sector and all workers will again be 
paid the same wage.     26
In the long-run equilibrium, all workers with a cultural affinity for the old sector 
will eventually retire.  These cultural effects will disappear from society.  However, 
presumably they will be displaced by new values among the younger generation.  These 
workers will likely develop their own affinity for working in the new sectors and may 
display the same aversion to potential adjustment in their future.    
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has incorporated culture into a trade model in two distinct ways.  The 
first approach assumed that national consumption of a domestically produced import-
competing good generates an external improvement in individual utility (the cultural 
externality model). The second method assumed that workers in an import-competing 
industry have an affinity for employment in that sector (the cultural affinity model).   
The results suggest that trade liberalization will have a more definite cultural 
effect in the first case, in which society derives a shared benefit from the domestic 
production of a particular good, rather than when workers within a declining industry 
have a cultural affinity to work in that sector.  While individual consumers can have little 
if any impact upon the price of the product in the market, each being too small to affect 
the market price, workers can maintain production in an industry by accepting a lower 
wage.   As a result trade liberalization in the cultural affinity model does not necessarily 
lead to the decline of the culturally important industry, whereas trade liberalization in the 
externality model will lead to such a decline.   
National welfare will rise with trade liberalization in the cultural affinity model, 
whereas it may fall in the externality model.  Note that with cultural affinities present, the   27
overall benefits from trade liberalization may be smaller than when a non-pecuniary 
cultural benefit is absent.  This suggests that we should recognize the presence of 
culturally motivated resistance to trade liberalization, which will have an impact upon 
market outcomes even when government regulations are eliminated.  The effect of such 
resistance may be to maintain distortions vis-à-vis the free market case:  thus measures of 
the benefits from trade liberalization countries may be overestimates.  All of this suggests 
that greater attention be paid to the effects of cultural consumption externalities in trade 
issues, such as policies regarding the protection of domestic media in Canada or the EU 
than to the consequences of cultural affinities in production, as in policies to protect 
French farmers or American timber workers.     
The growing interest in accommodating culturally-based exceptions in trade 
policy, however, risks opening a pandora's box of tariff demands, in which many 
industries claim to be in need of protection because of their cultural significance. 
Devising a defensible policy framework for assessing such claims will require a more 
adequate theory of the place of cultural value in trade (and more generally, in all 
economic exchange).  This represents a multidisciplinary challenge.  While such an effort 
goes far beyond the scope of the present paper, we have tried, through the models 
presented here, to indicate how economic and anthropological perspectives can jointly 
contribute to building the needed theoretical framework.  Modeling the cultural impacts 
of trade is intended to build a theoretically defensible basis for assessing claims to a 
cultural exception in trade disputes.  While some interesting proposals have been made 
(Baker 2000; Carmody 1999), far more is needed to provide a policy mechanism that is   28
applicable to a broad range of cases, and well grounded in both economics and culture 
theory.     29
References 
Acheson, K., and C. J. Maule. 1999. Much ado about culture: North American trade 
disputes. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Anaya, S. J. 1996. Indigenous peoples in international law. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Appadurai, Arjun. 1986. Introduction: Commodities and the politics of value. In The 
social life of things: Commodities in a cultural perspective, ed. A. Appadurai, 3-
63. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Baker, C. E. 2000. An economic critique of free trade in media products. North Carolina 
Law Review 78:1357-435. 
Bala, Vanketesh and Ngo Van Long, 2004. International Trade and Cultural Diversity 
with Preference Selection. European Journal of Political Economy. Forthcoming. 
Bernier, I. 1998. Cultural goods and services in international trade law. In The 
culture/trade quandary: Canada's policy options, ed. D. Browne, 108-48. Ottawa: 
Centre for Trade Policy and Law. 
Bhagwati, J. 1971. The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare. in Trade, 
Balance of Payments and Growth, Bhagwati et al (eds). North-Holland. 
Amsterdam. 
Bhala, R. 2001. International trade law: Theory and practice. Second ed. New York: 
Lexis Publishing. 
Birdsall, N., and R. Z. Lawrence. 1999. Deep integration and trade agreements: Good for 
developing countries? In Global public goods: International cooperation in the 
twenty-first century, ed. I. Kaul, I. Grunberg, and M. A. Stern, 128-51. New York: 
Oxford University Press.Cable, V. 1996. The new trade agenda: Universal rules 
amid cultural diversity. International Affairs [London] 72(2):227-46. 
Brown, Beverly A. 1995.  In Timber Country: Working People's Stories of 
Environmental Conflict and Urban Flight.  Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press.  
Budge, E. A. Wallis, trans. 1934.  The Wit and Wisdom of the Christian Fathers of Egypt: 
the Syrian Version of the "Apophthegmata Patrum."  London: Oxford University 
Press.   
Cable, V. 1996. The new trade agenda: Universal rules amid cultural diversity. 
International Affairs [London] 72(2):227-46. 
Carmody, C. 1999. When ‘cultural identity was not at issue’: Thinking about Canada -- 
certain measures concerning periodicals. Law and Policy in International 
Business 30(2):231ff. 
Coulter, L. 1995. Japan's Gaiben law: Economic protectionism or cultural perfectionism? 
Houston Journal of International Law 17:431-61.   30
Cowen, T. 2002. Creative Destruction: How Globalization is Changing the World 
Cultures, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Dominguez, V. R. 2000. Invoking culture: The messy side of “cultural politics”. In The 
politics of culture: Policy perspectives for individuals, institutions, and 
communities, ed. G. Bradford, M. Gary, and G. Wallach, 20-37. New York: The 
New Press.  
Doucouliagos, Chris. 1994.  A Note on the Evolution of Homo Economicus." Journal of 
Economic Issues 28 (3):877-83.  . 
European Commission. 1998. Contribution of the European Community on the 
multifunctional character of agriculture. Submitted by the European communities 
to the process of analysis and information exchange of the WTO Committee on 
agriculture. E. C. Directorate General of Agriculture. 
Francois, P., and T. van Ypersele (2002), “On the Protection of Cultural Goods,”  Journal 
of International Economics, 56 (2) 359-369.   
Gardner, B. 1996. European agriculture: Policies, production and trade. London: 
Routledge. 
Hannerz, Ulf. 1992.  Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of 
Meaning.  New York: Columbia University Press.   
Haron, S. 1995. The framework and concept of Islamic interest-free banking. Journal of 
Asian Business 11(1):26-39. 
Henrich, Joseph et al. 2001.  Group Report: What is the Role of Culture in Bounded 
Rationality? In Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten (eds.), Bounded Rationality: 
The Adaptive Toolbox. Pp. 343-359.  Cambridge: MIT Press.   
Kahler, Miles. 1996.  Trade and Domestic Differences.  National Diversity and Global 
Capitalism, Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds.  Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, pp. 298-332.   
Keat, Russell. 2000. Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market.  New York: St. 
Martin's Press.   
Keesing, Roger. 1974. Theories of culture. Annual Review of Anthropology 3:73-97. 
Knight, T. 1999. The dual nature of cultural products: An analysis of the World Trade 
Organization’s decisions regarding Canadian periodicals. University of Toronto 
Faculty of Law Review 57:165-91. 
Janeba, Eckard. 2004,  International Trade and Cultural Identity. National Bureau of 
Economic Research. Inc.,   NBER Working Paper 10426. 
Jones, R.W. (1971), “A Three-Factor Model in Theory Trade and History,” in Trade, 
Balance of Payments and Growth: Essays in Honor of C.P Kindleberger, (ed. J.N. 
Bhagwati, et.al.) Amsterdam, North-Holland.  \   31
Lazear, Edward. (1999), Culture and Language, Journal of Political Economy, 107 (6), 
Part 2, S95-S126. 
MacIntyre, Alasdair.  1984.  After virtue: a study in moral theory.  Second edition.  Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.   
Mussa. Michael. 1974.  Tariffs and the Distribution of Income: The Importance of Factor 
Specificity, Substitutability, and Intensity in the Short and Long Run.  Journal of 
Political Economy. v82. no 6. 1191-1203.   
Neary, J. Peter (1978), “Short-Run Capital Specificity and the Pure Theory of 
International Trade,”  The Economic Journal, 88 (351) 488-510.   
Pruzin, Daniel. 2002. U.S., Others Urge Saudis to Make Proposals to Reinvigorate 
Efforts for Accession to WTO.  International Trade Reporter 19 (8): 334-5 (Feb. 
21, 2002).   
Rabinovitch, V. 1998. The social and economic rationales for Canada’s domestic cultural 
policies. In The culture/trade quandary: Canada's policy options, ed. D. Browne, 
25-47. Ottawa: Centre for Trade Policy and Law. 
Rodrik, D. 1997. Has globalization gone too far?. Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics. 
Rosen, Sherwin. 1986. The Theory of Equalizing Differences. In Handbook of Labor 
Economics, O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard (eds). Elsevier Science Publishers BV.  
Stavenhagen, R. 1995. Cultural rights and human rights. In Economic, social and cultural 
rights: A textbook, ed. A. Eide, C. Krause, and A. Rosas, 63-77. Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff. 
Throsby, David. 2001. Economics and Culture.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
Thurow, Lester C.  1978.  Psychic income: useful or useless?  American Economic 
Review 68 (2):142-45.   
Vedrine, H., and D. Moisi. 2001. France in an age of globalization. Trans. P. H. Gordon. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Williams, R. 1958. Culture and society, 1780 - 1950. New York: Harper and Row. 
Winthrop, R. H. 1991. Dictionary of concepts in cultural anthropology. New York: 
Greenwood Press. 